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for Haiti 
Stephen A. Rose 
There was a lot of pressure on the SJA to come up with the right 
ROE-not only working with the local staff-but in this case, working 
directly with the Department of Defense. But the real burden that falls on 
the SJA is advising the commander and providing the means for the 
commander to translate ROE for that Marine on the ground. 
- Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni 
Marine Corps Gazette 
February 1996 
DURING THE COURSE OF A MILITARY CAREER, most of us have at least one occasion to stand at a crossroad of history-to participate 
directly in shaping an event that might someday be studied in tenth grade 
history books. My tum came in 1994. The event was Haiti. 
By lucky timing, my tour as Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for the u.s. Atlantic 
Command (USACOM), which then included the Caribbean in its geographic 
area of responsibility, began in the spring of 1994-about the same time when 
serious planning had begun for military intervention in Haiti. Aside from good 
timing, I was fortunate in two other ways. 
Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti 
First, the USACOM Commander,in,Chief, Admiral Paul Miller, believed in 
using his legal staff in a proactive mode. As a result, the SJA became a charter 
member of the inner circle tasked with developing the campaign plan. This 
early entree was useful when it became time to craft rules of engagement (ROE) 
embodying the commander's intent. What could not be foreseen, however, was 
that the ROE for Haiti would require rapid retooling as the mission shifted from 
a nonpermissive, forcible entry to a permissive administrative walk,on 
involving cooperation with Haitian forces. This initial phase of the Haiti 
campaign proved to be a harbinger of some of the ROE conundrums that were 
encountered during the later UN withdrawal from Somalia and the problems 
currently being encountered in Bosnia. 
My second slice of good fortune was in having Professor Jack Grunawalt as 
an ROE mentor-both during my time as a student at the Naval War College, 
and, since then, on an informal basis for aid when difficult questions of 
interpretation and precedent arise. He has long been my "pragmatics" teacher, 
especially adept at blending ROE theory with practical solutions for real,world 
challenges. His thousands of hours of teaching ROE issues have influenced 
several generations of operational lawyers involved in military campaigns. 
Those who have read this far will recognize that my essay differs in tone and 
content from other materials in this liber amicorum. It is part homage to Jack 
Grunawalt, part analysis of selected ROE issues, and part reportage of what 
took place behind the scenery during the initial phase of the Haiti campaign. 
Several excellent synopses of the Haiti ROE have already been written. l My 
goal is to complement these studies by digging deeper along unmined veins. 
About 90 percent of the internal DoD deliberations over the final language of 
the Haiti rules-a dialogue often more spirited than commentators 
realize-arose from 10 percent of the draft text. 
Every ROE package has a handful of clauses that serve as tone,setters and 
fulcrums for an operation. In essence, ROE become the umbilical cord 
connecting the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the lowliest Private 
in harm's way. ROE also serve as a reliable barometer, especially in military 
operations other than war, for gauging whether political goals and military 
means are properly synchronized. If Clausewitz were reviewing recent 
operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, he would likely be astonished by the 
finicky degree to which the U.S. military calibrates its ROE.2 What follows are 
two vignettes illustrating what happened behind the planning curtain when 
lawyers, operators, and policy makers sought to conjure up optimal ROE for the 
beginning of the Haiti campaign. 
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Friend, Foe, or Freelance? 
In the spring of 1994, USACOM activated Joint Task Force OTF) 180, 
spearheaded by the XVIII Airborne Corps, to develop an operational plan 
(OPLAN 2370) for forced entry into Haiti. It was unclear how much armed 
opposition could be expected from the military junta then running the country, 
but the JTF 180 plan relied on surprise and overwhelming force to reduce U.S. 
casualties3 by minimizing the period of actual engagement. A draft of the ROE 
annex for this plan was ready by mid,June. 
One cornerstone of the proposed ROE was designation of the armed forces 
of Haiti as "hostile"-i.e., they were subject to attack on recognition without 
first having to commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent against U.S. 
forces. The troublesome phrase underlying this concept turned out to be "on 
recognition." It was relatively easy to categorize Haiti's armed forces. They 
consisted of the Forces Armees D'Haiti (FADH) and its auxiliary, the 
well,armed National Police, known as the FRAPH. For ROE purposes, all other 
Haitians were deemed noncombatants. 
As the summer of 1994 wore on, however, this distinction between Haitian 
armed forces and civilians began to blur. By August, U.S. intelligence reports 
noted that many members of the FADH had begun wearing civilian clothes 
under their uniforms, and almost all of the FRAPH had discarded their police 
uniforms in favor of mufti while on duty. Reports also identified the formation 
of a civilian militia loosely organized by the FADH. This militia had no uniforms 
or distinctive badges, but was expected to be issued weapons in advance of 
perceived hostilities and to function as a kind of Haitian Volkssturm to defend 
the country. 
In reaction to this development, ROE planners at USACOM began to draft 
clarifying language to identify "hostile" Haitian forces-now running the 
gamut from regulars (FADH) to paramilitary (FRAPH) to civil militia-in terms 
of weaponry rather than apparel. This attempted refinement also proved to be 
problematic. In mid,August, the U.S. Defense Attache at Port au Prince 
estimated that Haitian civilians possessed at least 40,000 firearms.4 Given the 
chronic violence and vigilantism that plagued the country, most Haitians who 
could afford to do so had armed themselves. The typical family arsenal 
consisted of machetes, a shotgun or rifle, several handguns, and sometimes 
automatic weapons and grenades. Another factor fueling the potential for 
violence was continuing antagonism between the Haitian upper classes, which 
supported the military junta, and the followers of exiled President 
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Jean,Bertrand Aristide, who thirsted to settle their grievances with the small 
clique in economic and political power. 
Thus, u.s. planners had to anticipate that the initial stages of a forcible 
entry might encounter armed elements of the Haitian populace pursuing 
different goals: some ready to engage American forces; some eager to take 
advantage of a chaotic situation to carry out acts of political revenge or looting; 
and some trying to defend families and property. All were likely to be armed, 
and most would be in civilian attire. 
In such a confused environment, choice of ROE serves to allocate risk. 
Status, based ROE, in which pre, declared enemy forces are declared hostile and 
may be shot on sight, minimize the risk to u.s. troops but may lead to 
significant civilian casualties if enemy forces are not readily distinguishable 
from the general populace. Conversely, conduct,based ROE, which typically 
authorize force only in response to hostile acts or intentions, tend to reduce 
civilian casualties while increasing the risk to u.s. forces. Given the domestic 
political controversy swirling around the proposed military intervention in 
Haiti, the United States could ill afford American casualties; but neither could 
it permit a humanitarian intervention, only reluctantly sanctioned by the 
United Nations, to result in a bloodbath for Haitians. 
In early September, the legal staffs at USACOM and in the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staffs office continued work on ways to bridge the gap between 
status,based and conduct,based ROE for Haiti. The challenge was to develop a 
basic engagement criterion that balanced the risk of casualties and had clear 
meaning for the troops involved. The two legal staffs began at opposite ends of 
the ROE spectrum but eventually converged to a shared solution. 
USACOM continued to press for declaration of Haitian armed forces as 
hostile (i.e., status,based ROE) but recommended that identification of 
adversary forces be pegged to weapons rather than to uniforms, badges, or 
other customary indicia. The operative sentence of our recommendation was 
couched in terms of a presumption: 
You may presume that civilians in public armed with crew-served weapons, 
automatic weapons, rifles or shotguns are members of the FADH or National 
Police, and therefore may be treated as hostile.5 
The Joint Staff favored conduct,based ROE even for the initial hostilities 
phase and proposed that the final phrase in the USACOM draft be modified to 
read: " ... and therefore should be treated as potentially hostile and dealt with 
accordingly using all measures short of force if possible.,,6 In essence, this was a 
self,defense regimen dressed up with some extra adjectives and adverbs to 
convey a more assertive tone. USACOM continued to press the issue. 
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The Joint Staff then offered other modifications to stiffen the self,defense 
language: 
... and therefore should be treated as potentially hostile. 
A. \XThere hostile acts or intent are observed, deadly force is authorized. 
B. \XThere no hostile intent or acts are observed, all measures short of deadly 
force, consistent with mission accomplishment and security of the force, may be 
employed.7 
Albeit self,defense with an attitude, on the whole this was still self,defense.8 
USACOM continued to press. 
As a contingency measure, discussion shifted to refining USACOM's 
proposal for a weapon,based rule. Since it was known that a sizable portion of 
the Haitian populace lawfully owned and openly carried firearms, it was clearly 
overreaching to declare all armed civilians encountered in public areas as 
hostile. At the same time, it was equally clear that persons armed with 
crew,served or automatic weapons could reasonably be presumed to be 
members of the Haitian armed forces. The real debate arose over how to treat 
Haitians armed with shotguns and rifles. 
This became known in joint legal circles as the "long,gun" dispute. 
USACOM's original position had been to include both rifles and shotguns in 
the adversary identification matrix. The Joint Staff concluded, with some 
justification, that range rather than length of weapon should be the 
determining factor. USACOM planners yielded, but fretted that U.S. troops 
would be hard,pressed to distinguish rifles from shotguns in time to apply 
hostilities ROE to the former and self,defense ROE to the latter, especially in 
the uncertain light of the first hours of a pre,dawn assault. 
Three days before the scheduled attack date on 19 September, the NCA 
approved the final ROE package for a nonpermissive entry. The relevant rule is 
a hybrid of options debated during the preceding fortnight: 
You may presume that civilians in public armed with crew,served weapons, 
automatic weapons, or rifles are members of the FADH, National Police, or 
paramilitary groups, and therefore may treat them as hostile. Civilians in public 
armed with shotguns or pistols are presumed to be potentially hostile, but deadly 
force is not authorized unless such persons use or threaten to use armed force 
against U.S. troops, U.S. citizens, or designated foreign nationals.9 
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In retrospect, it is probably fortunate that a last~minute agreement with the 
Haitian leaders eliminated the need to use these ROE. to To be effective, such 
rules need to model real~world activities and choices. Despite weeks of 
discussion, the judge advocates involved in crafting the ROE for a pre~dawn 
airborne assault on Haiti were never fully satisfied that they had captured the 
fractal messiness of what lay ahead. The tradeoffs built into the final package 
strongly supported mission accomplishment-rapid elimination of armed 
resistance in Haiti-while fixing a reasonable, if somewhat artificial, 
breakpoint to distinguish noncombatants. Although OPLAN 2370 belongs to 
the dustbin of history, the ROE issues that surfaced during its construction were 
not unique and continue to challenge U.S. planners in current operations. 
The Specter of Mission Creep 
On 18 September 1994, U.S. forces were primed for a nonpermissive, forced 
entry into Haiti using hostilities ROE. The following day, pursuant to the 
Carter Agreement, they entered Haiti permissively under peacetime ROE. 
Their basic mission was to preserve essential civic order and establish a secure 
environment for the restoration of Haiti's legitimate government. l1 
In this effort to maintain public order, U.S. forces had an unlikely partner, 
their erstwhile adversary of the previous day, the FADH. The Carter 
Agreement had reserved a significant role for the FADH to continue routine 
police duties during the transition period. Direct involvement in foreign law 
enforcement was a task that U.S. military planners were loathe to tackle. 
Recent experience with "mission creep" in Somalia reinforced the notion that 
law enforcement responsibilities in a shattered country often become an 
operational tar baby for military units. 
On the eve of the American entry into Haiti, it appeared that U.S. policy 
makers were comfortable treating "essential civic order" as a macro 
requirement to prevent widespread chaos and loss of life within the indigenous 
population rather than as a guarantee of U.S. protection for individual citizens. 
On 20 September, however, one of the more notorious incidents of the Haiti 
campaign ended up trumping, at least temporarily, DoD's deep~rooted an.'{iety 
about mission creep. Using brute force, Haitian police dispersed a crowd of 
pro~ Aristide demonstrators which had gathered in a festive mood at the edge of 
a marshalling area for arriving U.S. units. Also on hand were numerous 
representatives from the media, who videotaped a street vendor being clubbed 
to death while U.S. troops stood by passively. Newspapers and television 
networks reported the incident extensively, lambasting policy makers and 
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military planners for crippling troop effectiveness with inadequate ROE.12 
When new ROE cards appeared the next day, authorizing U.S. forces to 
intervene to prevent death or serious injury to Haitians, news reports 
understandably attributed this modification to the media uproar of the day 
before. 13 
The irony is that this "change" in ROE had already been set into motion on 
18 September, before the first soldier set foot in Haiti, and had anticipated the 
sort of incident that actually happened. Unfortunately, staffing delays held up 
execution of the policy shift and dissemination of the change in ROE until a day 
after the fatal beating. In part, this delay was procedural-stemming from the 
laborious nature of the review process for modifying engagement rules of 
national importance. In part, the delay was substantive-a by,product of an 
ongoing debate about the role of the FADH during the interregnum period and 
the need to disarm Haitian society. To understand how all these variables 
interacted to create the new ROE card that appeared on 20 September, it is 
worth a short tour inside the ROE "sausage factory" that existed at the time. 
From the beginning, military planners had recognized that the issue of 
Haitian,on,Haitian crime would be crucial. By June 1994, the ROE cards 
designed for both the hostilities and post,hostilities phases of the 
nonpermissive, forcible entry plan, Operation Uphold Democracy (OPLAN 
2370 for JTF 180), contained explicit guidance for the troops: 
Detain persons suspected of committing a serious criminal act (any act 
committed after H,hour that would constitute the offense of homicide, 
aggravated assault, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or larceny if committed in the 
United States). Use the minimum force necessary, up to and including deadly 
force. Use only non,deadly force to detain civilians suspected of committing a 
serious criminal act that does not pose a serious threat to human life (e.g., 
larceny) .14 
The analogous card for the permissive entry plan, Operation Maintain 
Democracy (OPLAN 2380 for JTF 190), contained no such guidance, which 
explains why U.S. forces looked on passively as the Haitian police administered 
a five,minute fatal beating to the vendor on 20 September. The closest 
approximation was a rule allowing intervention in a defensive mode. 
You may use necessary force to stop, disarm, and detain members of the Haitian 
military, police, other armed persons, or other persons committing hostile acts or 
showing hostile intent. Stop and detain other persons who interfere with your 
mission. IS 
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In this context, the range of what could be protected was set out in a prefatory 
note to the soldier card: 
Nothing in the ROE limits your right to use necessary force to defend yourself, 
your fellow servicemembers, your unit, other JTF personnel, key facilities, and 
property designated by your commander.16 
Armed with these ROE, it would have taken a bold commander to interpret 
them on D+ 1 as including protection of Haitian nationals. 
So, how did the disconnect arise between OPLAN 2370 and OPLAN 2380? It 
is misleading to suggest that OPLAN 2370 was more bellicose due to its primary 
focus as a forced entry plan; the same intervention rule showed up in the 2370 
post,hostilities card, which covered a range of civil,military operations 
equivalent to those being dealt with in OPLAN 2380. Part of the answer lies in 
the rigorous compartmentalization of OPLAN 2370. Although the two plans 
were developed in parallel, the JTF 180 team fleshing out OPLAN 2370 could 
not share ROE with its JTF 190 counterparts preparing OPLAN 2380 until a few 
days before the execution date.17 USACOM had visibility over both plans as 
they developed, but overlooked the ROE difference until about two weeks 
before the expected D,Day. First realization of the difference in early 
September did not set off alarm bells within the USACOM staff, since the 
working expectation at that time was that OPLAN 2370l]TF 180 ROE would 
control during the first stages of any incursion. Nonetheless, the ROE team at 
USACOM began to draft a request to the Joint Staff to crosswalk relevant JTF 
180 rules into JTF 190. 
At this point, approximately 10 September, matters bogged down. 
USACOM and JTF 190 quickly agreed on the need for authority to intervene in 
Haitian, on, Haitian violence. Both sides concurred that deadly force was 
appropriate, if necessary, to prevent death or serious physical injury. ClTF 190 
wanted to go a step further, however, and suggested that the original 
formulation, allowing only non, deadly force to detain Haitians committing 
property crimes, might be too weak to control looting. After further discussion, 
a distinction was made between fleeing looters (who could not be engaged with 
deadly force) and looters who posed a threat to U.S. personnel seeking to 
detain them (deadly force authorized in self,defense, if necessary). In essence, 
neither side was eager to push for a rule of engagement permitting thieves to be 
shot in the back. IS 
A similar question arose regarding disarmament. USACOM directed JTF 190 
to develop an assertive weapons control program to reduce the potential for 
street violence. Haitian law generally allowed its citizens to be armed in public, 
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butJTF 190's approved ROE specified that a soldier "may use necessary force to 
stop [and] disarm ... armed persons.,,19 On 10 September, the Staff Judge 
Advocate for JTF 190 sent me a fax seeking clarification on the degree of force 
that could be used to execute a disarmament policy. 
This command OTF 190] is highly concerned about possible limitations on its 
ability to disarm the population. Specifically, may deadly force be used, if 
necessary, when an armed civilian flees during our attempt to disarm?2o 
This question revisits in another guise the fleeing looter scenario discussed 
above. By suggesting that continued possession of a weapon might per se be a 
threat to either the security or mission of the force, JTF 190 was seeking a return 
to status,based ROE for a limited category of individuals. A few days later, the 
C]TF 190 raised this same issue with the USACOM Deputy CINC, arguing the 
existence of an ROE'mission mismatch: 
For instance, if a small patrol comes around a comer in Port-au-Prince and there 
is a Haitian ten yards away with a rifle who then runs, the patrol cannot use 
deadly force to stop him. Thereafter, all Haitians with weapons will run, and the 
disarmament mission cannot be accomplished.21 
For several days more, discussion continued over the best way to calibrate 
the ROE to critical sub-tasks such as disarmament, curfew enforcement, and 
deterrence of looting, all of which supported the main mission of establishing a 
secure and stable environment. By D-2, 17 September, USACOM sent the Joint 
Staff its package of recommended ROE changes to "insure a seamless 
hand-over between C]TF 180 and C]TF 190."22 The Chairman, serving as 
interlocutor for the Secretary of Defense,23 messaged USACOM on D-Day, 19 
September, that the changes had been approved as submitted.24 In a nutshell, 
deadly force was authorized to detain persons observed committing crimes 
involving death or serious injury; non-deadly force was available to control 
property crimes, enforce curfews, stop looting, and disarm Haitians.25 Hours 
later, USACOM signaled approval to JTF 180 and JTF 190 headquarters,26 and 
dissemination to troops in the field took place during the next 24 hours, but not 
in time to prevent the beating death on D+ 1. 
On first reflection, this one-day dissemination period may seem to be slow, 
but the implementation process involved training deployed troops to cope with 
an expanded set of responsibilities. Explaining whether robbery, which is a 
crime involving the taking of property from someone by force, authorized a 
deadly or non-deadly intervention response was one of several adventures that 
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the JTF 190 legal advisors faced in sorting out the new ROE for their 
commander and troopsP This overall episode aptly illustrates the 50 percent 
rule that can plague ROE development-on controversial issues, each 
successive review level tends to use up half of the remaining time before 
D,Day. As a result, most of the available time gets absorbed in policy 
deliberations, often creating a frantic scramble when it comes time for 
dissemination to the ttigger,puller in the field. 
In retrospect, it also seems that the long debate about mission creep led to 
compromises that were more lawyer,friendly than troop-friendly. As Jack 
Grunawalt always hammered home in his lectures, ROE should be written for 
field use, not CNN consumption. Before Haiti, I had always believed that the 
primary function of ROE was to guide the behavior of the mythical Private 
Smudlap in the field. I realize now that draft ROE also exert pressure on the 
other end of the chain of command by forcing senior commanders and the 
NCA to come to closure regarding their policy for use of force. 
The two vignettes described in this essay reflect the tensions that typically 
arise when crafting ROE for a highly visible, contentious operation. For 
example, at what point does the push for thoroughness and certainty in the 
rules end up undercutting an on-scene commander's flexibility to deal with 
unexpected situations? Conversely, when does too much flexibility become 
unwelcome ambiguity?28 
These tradeoffs are especially challenging in the murky world of peace 
operations. ROE is both art and science. There can be no universal recipe, since 
the rules always need to be tailored to a specific context; even so, the basic ROE 
themes and ingredients transcend geopolitical atmospherics. The lessons 
learned in Somalia served as a useful head start for those of us working up the 
Haiti ROE. Similarly, the choices made for Haiti, both successful and 
unsuccessful, have added to the accumulation of experience available for 
future planners. 
Notes 
1. See Army Center for Law and Military Operations, Law and Military Operations in Haiti, 
1994-95: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates 29-38 (Oct. 3, 1995 draft) [hereinafter CLAMO 
Study]. See also Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), 
Operation Uphold Democracy, Multinational Force Haiti After-Action Report, 29 July 1994 to 
13 January 1995, at 5-6 (May 1995) [hereinafter 10th Mountain AARJ. 
2. Karl von Clausewitz's classic precept of war as a continuation of politics by other means 
was coined in an era when nations treated war as a reasonable and even noble attribute of 
sovereignty. In one sense, the elaborate attention which the United States gives to formulating 
detailed rules of engagement for its military forces is the full flowering ofClausewitz's principle. 
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At the same time, Clausewitz might view our preoccupation with the rule oflaw as excessive and 
sympathize with the pungent conclusion of one recent commentator that "[a]ttempts to bring 
our wonderful, comfortable, painstakingly humane laws and rules to bear on broken countries 
drunk with blood and anarchy constitute the ass end of imperialism." Ralph Peters, After The 
Revolution, PARAMETERS. Summer 1995, at 13. 
3. For the record, it should be noted that all the intervention plans for Haiti called for a 
multinational force. Eventually, more than 3,000 personnel from 32 other countries joined the 
U.S. effort in Haiti. During the crucial period from April-September 1994, however, the military 
planning and initial execution phase of the intervention were almost exclusively a U.S. project. 
4. Message, U.S. Defense Attache Office, Port au Prince, Haiti, Subj: Weapons Commonly 
Held by Civilians (161839Z Aug 94). 
5. Fax Memorandum from Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Atlantic Command, to Legal Advisor 
for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Sept. 6, 1994). 
6. Fax Memorandum from Legal Advisor for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Staff Judge 
Advocate, U.S. Atlantic Command (Sept. 7,1994). 
7. Notes taken by Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Atlantic Command, of telephone call from 
Legal Advisor for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Sept. 6, 1994). 
8. The phrase "consistent with mission accomplishment and security of the force" is the 
kind of equivocation that gives commanders a headache. Seen in the best light, such qualifiers 
provide flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. Seen in the worst light, they seem to be 
weasel words cueing the commander that his judgment will be questioned if matters go 
badly-e.g., if there had been substantial U.S. or Haitian casualties. 
9. See CLAMO Study, supra note I, at app. G for the text of the JTF 180 ROE card for 
nonpermissive entry. 
10. Id. at 11 (discussion of the agreement signed on Sept 19, 1994, by former President 
Carter and Emile Jonaissant, the military-appointed president of Haiti) [Carter Agreement]. 
11. See U.S. Atlantic Command, Operation Uphold Democracy: U.S. Forces in Haiti (May 
1997)(monograph prepared by USACOM command historian as after-action report of Haiti 
operations 1994-96), at 16-19. 
12. See, e.g., Haitian Police Attack Crowd: U.S. Troops Watch. WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1994, at 
AI; Haitian Police Savagely Club Demonstrators; Man Beaten to Death at Port; Disgusted G.I.'s 
Forced to Watch. HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 21, 1994, at Al. 
13. See, e.g., U.S. Troops Cleared for Deadly Force, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept 22,1994, atAI; 
The G.I.'s and the "Rules of Engagement," N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 22, 1994, at A13. 
14. Headquarters, Joint Task Force 180, Tab F (draft ROE card for hostilities phase) and 
Tab G (draft ROE card for civil-military operations) to Appendix 8 to Annex C to JTF 180 
OPLAN Oune 13, 1994). 
15. See CLAMO Study, supra note I, at app. I. 
16. Id. The entire ROE card was reprinted on 23 Sept. 1994 in THE WASH. TIMES at A20. 
17. See 10th Mountain AAR, supra note I, at 5. 
18. The one exception to this rule was "mission-essential property" designated by the 
commander, which could be protected with deadly force. The definition of mission-essential 
property usually encompassed weapons, explosives, cryptological equipment, classified material, 
etc. 
19. See CLAMO Study, supra note I, at app. I. 
20. Fax Memorandum from Staff Judge Advocate, JTF 190 to Staff Judge Advocate, 
USACOM, at 1 (Sept. 10, 1994). 
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21. Fax Memorandum from Commanding General, JTF 190 to Deputy Commander in 
Chief, USACOM, ad (13 Sept. 1994). 
22. Message, Commander-in-Chief, USACOM, Subj: ROE Request Serial One (170008Z 
Sep 94). 
23. Technically, the chain of command for approval of national-level ROE runs from a 
geographic commander-in-chief, such as CINCUSACOM, directly to the Secretary of Defense. 
In practice, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff serve as a coordinating filter for 
operational matters between the CINCs and the Secretary. 
24. Message, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subj: Approval of ROE Request Serial One 
(190450Z Sep 94). 
25. ROE modifications were only one aspect of the larger debate over mission creep. In early 
September, USACOM developed the following matrix of activities to summarize the level of 
military involvement in various police functions, during the period before the legitimate 
government of Haiti was scheduled to return: 
Police Activity 
T rafflc control 
Domestic disputes 
Minor crime (Shoplifting) 
Major property crime 
(larceny, burglary) 
Personal violence crime 
(homicide, aggravated 
assault, arson, robbery) 
Peaceful demonstrations 
Violent demonstrations 
Major civil disorder (riots, 
looting) 
Hostage rescue 
Detention 
Forensic investigations 
Prisons/Jails 
Current Haitian 
Police Involvement 
(Apolitical) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(Civil Disorders) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
(Special Situations) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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U.S. Military Involvement 
Only to support military mission 
No 
No 
Only when observed, non-deadly force 
authorized to detain perpetrator 
Only when observed, deadly force 
authorized to detain perpetrator 
No 
Yes, if required for force protection or 
mission accomplishment 
Yes 
Yes, if subject is on protected persons list 
Yes 
No 
No 
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26. Message, Commander-in-Chief, USACOM, Subj: ROE Change Serial One (190821Z 
Sep 94). 
27. In addition to the obvious training challenge, the physical act of printing and distributing 
new ROE cards to every service member in the JTF during the first day in a foreign country was, 
by itself, a feat requiring considerable energy and coordination. See CLAMO Study, supra note 1, 
at33. 
28. ROE have multiple "users"-policy makers, military commanders, troops, and curious 
onlookers such as the media. Ideally, the troops want clear, simple rules stacked like 
commandments on a 3"x5" card. Commanders want a well-equipped ROE tool kit inside a 
flexible framework. Operational lawyers want the ROE package to be a thorough, seamless 
whole without loose ends or gaps---i.e., a product not requiring intricate glosses. The NCA 
wants all of the above, plus rules that translate into useful sound bites for the inevitable media 
grillings. 
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